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ARGUMENT 
Appellants and counsel acknowledge it is a trial court's prerogative to move cases 
along at an orderly pace to promote justice. However, this practical goal is not inflexible 
and must adjust, in the interests of justice, to preserve a court's overarching goal of 
allowing the parties to seek redress for injuries and the resolution of disputes on their 
merits and in a fundamentally fair way. See, e.g., Carmen v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601, 603 
(Utah 1976) (noting the fundamental principle that "reason and justice shall prevail over 
the arbitrary and uncontrolled will of any one person," including "courts and judges," and 
that "[i]t has always been the policy of our law to resolve doubts in favor of permitting 
parties to have their day in court on the merits of a controversy."); accord Boice ex. rel 
Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 71,^10, 982 P.2d 565 ("[Jjustice and fairness will require that 
a court allow a party to designate witnesses, conduct discovery, or otherwise perform 
tasks covered by a scheduling order after the court-imposed deadline for doing so has 
expired."). 
The present case provides just such a situation. The Appellants Wayne and Carol 
Welsh (the "Welshes") have suffered severe permanent injuries as a result of 
Defendant/Appellee Hospital Corporation of Utah d/b/a Lakeview Hospital's 
("Lakeview") negligence. Lakeview left Mr. Welsh, the former State Auditor, 
unattended on an elevated metal examination table despite the fact that he came to the 
hospital for treatment following a syncope and complaints of dizziness and nausea. 
While unattended, Mr. Welsh fell off the table, resulting a fracture to his skull, subdural 
hematoma, coma, and permanent brain damage from which Mr. and Mrs. Welsh will 
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likely never recover their former quality of life. (R. 2-9; 218-19.) The Welshes came to 
court to obtain redress for their devastating injuries. The litigation has encountered 
delays as a result of the actions of both parties' counsel. 
Unfortunately, the trial court has let its practical goal of moving the case at an 
orderly pace overshadow its primary purpose and function of providing a fair forum for 
litigants to seek redress for injuries. Distressingly, the trial court has acted both 
arbitrarily and contrary to law in doing so. For example, in its haste to sanction the 
Welshes, the trial court ignored that: 
• The Welshes obtained new counsel on November of 2008. The Welshes' 
new counsel requested a minor 39-day extension to designate experts and 
submit initial expert reports. This request would not have delayed 
resolution of the case a single day, as it did not propose changes to any 
other dates in the scheduling order, including the yet-to-be-scheduled trial 
date. (R. 71-74, 76.) 
• The trial court initially granted the requested extension on December 29, 
2008 ("December 29, 2008 Ruling"), before abruptly changing its mind and 
imposing sanctioning against the Welshes sua sponte on January 22, 2009. 
Notably, the Welshes had already designated experts and submitted expert 
reports pursuant to the extended deadline as of January 22, 2009 and 
mediation had been scheduled. {See Addenda A & C to the Welshes' 
opening Brief.) 
• Utah law and constitutional principles of due process require the trial court 
to find intentional misconduct by the Welshes themselves, before 
sanctioning the Welshes. The trial court did not make any such findings 
before sanctioning the Welshes on January 22, 2009. {See Addendum A.) 
Nor is there any evidence in the record to support a finding that the 
Welshes or their counsel intentionally disregarded any orders. There is no 
evidence that the Welshes—the sanctioned parties—are responsible for any 
of the delays in the case. 
• Counsel for both the Welshes and Lakeview contributed to the delays in 
this case. Yet, the trial court chose to harshly punish only the Welshes 
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simply because their counsel happened to seek the last extension—an 
extension that in no way would have delayed the trial. 
• Neither the Welshes nor any of their attorneys disregarded any dates 
imposed by the scheduling orders. Rather the Welshes' counsel properly 
filed a Motion to request an extension of time where an extension was 
needed and complied with the trial court's deadlines. 
• Lakeview has never asserted, and could not assert, that it would have 
suffered prejudice from the requested extension. 
These facts required the trial court to exercise temperance in order to promote and 
preserve fairness and justice, not to harshly sanction the Welshes by precluding their use 
of expert testimony for filing a Motion, before expiration of the existing deadline, 
seeking a minor extension of time to designate experts and submit expert reports. See, 
e.g., United States v. Golyvansky, 291 F.3d 1245, 1249 (10th Cir. 2002) ("It would be a 
rare case where, absent bad faith, a district court should exclude evidence rather than 
continue the proceedings."). Instead of using its authority to promote justice, the trial 
court ordered that the trial be unfairly weighted to Lakeview's favor, simply because 
Lakeview happened to not seek the last extension. 
Lakeview, for its part, attempts to justify the trial court's ruling to preserve the 
unexpected and unearned benefit it has received. However, in doing so, Lakeview 
mischaracterizes the facts and misinterprets the requirements of Utah law. 
L LAKEVIEW MISCHARACTERIZES THE FACTS TO IMPROPERLY 
MAKE ITSELF LOOK BLAMELESS FOR THE DELAYS IN THIS CASE 
AND TO TRY TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF 
WILLFULNESS. 
Lakeview acknowledges that Utah law authorizes sanctions only upon a finding 
that "(1) the party's behavior was willful; (2) the party has acted in bad faith; (3) the 
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court can attribute some fault to the party; or (4) the party has engaged in persistent 
dilatory tactics tending to frustrate the judicial process." Kilpatrick v. Bullough 
Abatement, Inc., 2008 UT 82,f25, 199 P.3d 957 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Lakeview cannot dispute that the trial court failed to make the requisite findings prior to 
sanctioning the Welshes in its January 22, 2009 Order denying the Welshes' Motion for 
an Enlargement of Time ("January 22 Order"). There was no evidentiary basis to support 
such findings then, and there is no such basis now, notwithstanding the trial court's 
attempt to justify the sanctions after-the-fact in its April 14, 2009 Order denying the 
Welshes' Motion for Relief from Order and for Entry of Order Enlarging Time ("April 14 
Order"). This is reversible error. 
A, Lakeview Mischaracterizes the Facts to Try to Create an Evidentiary 
Basis for the Sanctions. 
Cognizant of the fact that the sanctions lack evidentiary support, Lakeview 
attempts to manufacture a pattern of intentional dilatoriness and willful disobedience by 
the Welshes to justify the sanctions. Lakeview claims the "Welshes are appealing the 
trial court's denial of their fifth request for additional time" and that the "Welshes' 
counsel failed to adhere to the trial court's fourth scheduling order." (Lakeview's Brief, 
p. 3 (emphasis added) (original emphasis omitted).) Lakeview's brief is replete with 
accusations that the Welshes' repeatedly failed to comply with the trial court's scheduling 
orders. {See id., p. 13, 24, 26-28.) These are blatant mischaracterizations. 
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1. Lakeview contributed to the delays in this case. 
Contrary to Lakeview's insinuation, neither the Welshes nor their counsel 
unilaterally sought five extensions of the scheduling order. Rather, prior to the Welshes' 
November 26, 2008 Motion for an Enlargement of Time, the parties' stipulated to each 
amended scheduling order. (R. 42-47; 50-55; 61-66.) Lakeview's counsel prepared two 
of the amended scheduling orders—the February 11, 2008 and the September 30, 2008 
Scheduling Orders—which indicates that it was primarily Lakeview that sought those 
extensions. (R. 50-55; 61-66.) Lakeview's counsel clearly sought, utilized and 
voluntarily consented to the extended schedule provided by each stipulated scheduling 
order as much as the Welshes' counsel. For example, prior to the first amended 
scheduling order, entered on May 25, 2007, Lakeview's counsel requested an additional 
month to conduct expert discovery, which request the Welshes' then-counsel, Nathan 
Wilcox, accommodated. (See May 4, 2007 Letter from Mr. Wilcox to Mark Riekhof, 
Lakeview's counsel, R. 355, attached as Addendum D to the Welshes' opening Brief.) 
This Court must reject Lakeview's disingenuous attempts to re-color the facts to make 
itself and its counsel appear blameless for the delays in this case. 
In imposing sanctions against the Welshes, the trial court ignored Lakeview's 
counsel's participation in delaying this case. In fact, the trial court completely ignored 
that Lakeview's counsel delayed final resolution of this matter as well. The Welshes' 
November 26, 2008 Motion for Enlargement of Time sought only to change the expert 
disclosure date, with no corresponding change to the deadlines for expert depositions, 
dispositive motions, or readiness for trial. (R. 72-74.) Thus, the extension sought by the 
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Welshes' counsel in November 2008 would not have resolved this case any sooner than 
that contemplated by the September 30, 2008 Scheduling Order. 
The trial court arbitrarily decided to sanction the Welshes just because their 
counsel happened to seek the last alteration of the Scheduling Order, without regard for 
the conduct of Lakeview beforehand, and no matter how ultimately insignificant the 
proposed alteration. This is not consistent with the tempered use of judicial discretion 
required by the Supreme Court. See Carmen, supra. 
2. Neither the Welshes nor their counsel failed to comply with the 
trial court's scheduling orders. 
Equally baseless is Lakeview's argument that the Welshes and their counsel failed 
to comply with the trial court's scheduling orders. In support of this argument, Lakeview 
first asserts that the Welshes repeatedly failed to appear for their depositions. This is a 
misrepresentation. Notably, Lakeview provides no record support for this accusation. 
Lakeview does not provide a single record cite where it (a) sent a letter to the Welshes' 
counsel discussing an alleged failure to appear, (b) filed a motion to compel their 
appearance or sought sanctions for nonappearance, or (c) any other evidence that the 
rescheduling of the Welshes' depositions was as a result of their failure to appear to a 
properly noticed deposition. Rather, Lakeview directs this Court only to the fact that the 
Welshes' depositions were noticed several times, and insinuates that the rescheduling was 
necessitated by their failure to appear. This unsupported allegation is not true and must 
be rejected. In fact, both Wayne and Carol Welsh have been deposed, making the 
argument immaterial as well. 
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However, there is ample evidence in the record that Lakeview failed cooperate in 
discovery by not making its employees available for deposition, including Allen 
Kunnard, a key witness to Lakeview's negligence, despite repeated requests from the 
Welshes' counsel. (See the Welshes' Opening Brief, Fact Nos. 5, 7 10, 13, 16, and 29; 
Addenda D, E, G, and J.) The Welshes' counsel still has been unable to depose Mr. 
Kunnard, as Lakeview refused following the trial court's January 22 Order. Lakeview's 
refusal to cooperate in discovery in this regard was one of the primary reasons the 
Welshes were forced to request additional time to complete their expert reports, as Mr. 
Kunnard's deposition would have been beneficial for the expert's analysis. When it 
became clear that Lakeview and/or its counsel were simply delaying discovery, the 
Welshes' counsel proceeded as expeditiously as possible to produce its reports without 
the benefit of the depositions. While this was not the preferred course of action, the 
Welshes and their counsel were diligently trying to "move this case forward" as 
admonished by the Court. (See September 30, 2008 Scheduling Order, Addendum F to 
the Welshes' Opening Brief.) Accordingly, unlike Lakeview's unsubstantiated 
allegations, the Welshes' have provided record support of Lakeview's noncompliance.1 
Second, Lakeview seeks refuge from its own dilatory tactics by claiming the 
Welshes failed to comply with the trial court's scheduling orders by not conducting 
1
 Lakeview claims that the Welshes' counsel should have issued depositions notices 
for Lakeview's employees. In retrospect, it appears Lakeview is correct. The Welshes' 
counsel sought to work with Lakeview and its counsel to schedule depositions at 
mutually convenient times, in accordance with the Standards of Professionalism and 
Civility promulgated by the Supreme Court. See Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 14-301, 
Standards 6, 10, and 15. This effort at professionalism and civility was apparently 
misplaced. 
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discovery prior to the dates imposed by the scheduling orders. This is a misnomer. 
Neither the Welshes nor their counsel disregarded the fact discovery deadline; rather, 
they exercised their prerogative not to serve written discovery requests on Lakeview. 
Lakeview's alternative argument that the Welshes failed to depose Lakeview's 
employees within the fact discovery cutoff is also a misnomer. Both the Welshes' 
counsel and Lakeview's counsel, by agreement, scheduled depositions for after the close 
of fact discovery. (See R. 361-62, 366.) Clearly, Lakeview shares the blame for the 
delays in this case and the trial court should not have rewarded Lakeview's actions and 
inactions by preventing the jury from hearing the best evidence available. 
Finally, Lakeview claims that the Welshes disregarded the trial court's scheduling 
order by filing a Motion seeking an extension to submit initial expert reports "after being 
expressly warned" that "the case would be dismissed if it was not moved along." 
(Lakeview's Brief, pp. 26-27.) This argument is difficult to understand. Filing a Motion 
requesting an extension of a deadline does not constitute willful disregard for either the 
deadline or the Order containing that deadline. 
Contrary to Lakeview's argument, this conclusion is not changed by the trial 
court's admonishment in the September 30, 2008 Scheduling Order: "Last amended 
order. Case to be moved along or it will be dismissed." (September 30, 2008 Scheduling 
Order, Addendum F to the Welshes' Opening Brief.) It is not sanctionable conduct to file 
a motion pursuant to Rule 7 asking the Court for a modest extension. A motion is the 
permissible means by which a party makes "an application to the court for an order," 
including an order for an extended deadline. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1). Even the case law 
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cited by Lakeview does not support this proposition. In Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307 
(Utah 1993), for example, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's imposition of 
sanctions for the plaintiffs late filing of an expert affidavit "in view of the fact that 
[plaintiff] did not at any time ask to be relieved of the time requirement of the 
[scheduling] order." Id, at 310. Indeed, as Lakeview acknowledges, in the September 30, 
2008 Scheduling Order, the trial court expressly authorized the parties to file "motions" if 
"the Court needs to intervene in discovery." (September 30, 2008 Scheduling Order, R. 
67 & Addendum F to the Welshes' opening Brief.) 
Moreover, the Welshes' Motion for an Enlargement of Time did not seek to delay 
the case from being "moved along." No other dates in the September 30, 2008 
Scheduling Order, including the yet-to-be-scheduled trial date, were to be changed. (R. 
71-74.) There was no prejudice to Lakeview or the trial court from the Welshes' Motion. 
Tellingly, Lakeview has never claimed prejudice. Simply put, the trial court's granting of 
the Motion would not have prolonged ultimate resolution of the case or prejudiced any 
party. The trial court recognized this, at the outset at least, by granting the Welshes' 
Motion on December 29, 2008, (see Addendum C), before abruptly and inexplicably 
changing its mind on January 22, 2009 and reversing its prior ruling. 
In fact, Lakeview's own conduct before this Court undermines its argument. For 
example, Lakeview sought and obtained two extensions of time to file its brief on 
appeal,2 even though second extensions are "not favored." See Utah R. App. P. 22(b)(1) 
By Lakeview's own argument, it violated this rule by seeking a disfavored second 
2
 (See Court's Docket, attached as Addendum A to this Reply Memorandum.) 
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extension. Lakeview further filed a Motion to Correct the Record on Appeal pursuant to 
Rule 11(e) of the Appellate Rules the same day it filed its brief. (See Addendum A to 
this Reply Brief.) Lakeview's Brief discussed the allegedly omitted pleading, and 
Lakeview attached the pleading to its brief—all before its Motion to Correct the Record 
was fully briefed, let alone granted. See, e.g., State v. Law, 2003 UT App 228, 75 P.3d 
923 (noting the general rule that appellate courts may not consider matters outside of the 
record and observing that "although the record may be supplemented if anything material 
is omitted, it may not be done by simply including the omitted material in the party's 
addendum."). Should Lakeview have been sanctioned for filing a disfavored Motion for 
a second enlargement of time or attaching pleadings to its brief that it believed were 
outside of the record? Of course not, because filing a Motion is the proper way to 
request relief, even if it is not favored; because Lakeview's actions caused no prejudice to 
any party; and because sometimes technical rules need to be relaxed in favor of the 
Court's loftier goal of considering the merits of a controversy on all of the facts. 
Accordingly, Lakeview's arguments regarding the Welshes' and their counsel's 
conduct are nothing more than disingenuous attempts to create a pattern of intentionally 
dilatory conduct by the Welshes to belatedly justify the trial court's award of sanctions. 
Lakeview's own conduct in this case shows that it is far from blameless for any delays. 
Once Lakeview's factual mischaracterizations are stripped away, it is clear that there was 
After filing its brief, Lakeview later withdrew its Motion to Correct the Record, 
claiming it overlooked that the allegedly omitted pleading was, in fact, in the record. 
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no evidentiary basis to support the trial court's award of sanctions against the Welshes or 
their counsel. 
B. The Trial Court's Implication of Willful Noncompliance by the 
Welshes in its April 14 Order was Error. 
As indicated in the Welshes' opening Brief, pp. 28-30, the trial court did not make 
any of the four requisite findings of intentional misconduct by the Welshes prior to 
imposing sanctions against the Welshes in its January 22 Order. No such facts exist. 
Lakeview argues that this error was cured by the trial court's April 14 Order, where the 
trial court attempted to justify the sanctions after-the-fact by implying willful 
noncompliance from the facts that the expert designations and reports were not submitted 
by December 1, 2008 deadline and the Welshes asserted neither surprise nor unforeseen 
circumstances as an excuse. (See Lakeview's Brief, p. 24; April 14 Order, p. 10.) 
Lakeview's argument is meritless. 
In fact, the argument that sanctions can be imposed based on the mere failure to 
meet a deadline has been expressly rejected. In Kilpatrick, the Supreme Court made 
clear, by stating as & point heading, that "The Fault Requirement Cannot Be Satisfied by 
Mere Noncompliance Absent Any Additional Evidence of Willful Behavior'' 2008 UT 82, 
at Section III(B) (between ^ 3 0 and 31). The Supreme Court observed that ascribing 
"fault" from the mere failure to meet a deadline is tantamount to "strict liability," which 
is inconsistent with Utah law. Id. at ^32-33. Nevertheless, this is precisely what the 
trial court did in the present case. Failure to provide an excuse such as surprise or 
unforeseen circumstances for noncompliance does not qualify as "additional evidence of 
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willful behavior." Id. at Section III(B) (capitalization omitted). To the contrary, the 
record is devoid of any willful noncompliance by the Welshes or their counsel. See id. at 
f 30 (observing that, to impose sanctions, the "record in this case" must "demonstrate 
willful disobedience of the CMO [Case Management Order]." ). Rather, as indicated, the 
Welshes filed a Motion for a minor extension of time to designate experts and submit 
expert reports, prior to expiration of the existing deadline, which caused no prejudice to 
either Lakeview or the trial court. 
Moreover, the trial court's also erred by attempting to make findings to justify the 
sanctions after they had already been imposed. The sanctions were imposed sua sponte 
by the trial court, after the trial court had initially granted the motion for an extension. 
{See January 22 Order and December 29, 2008 Ruling, Addenda A and C to the Welshes' 
opening Brief.) This deprived the Welshes of an opportunity to provide an excuse before 
they were sanctioned. 
Indeed, the delays caused by Mr. Wilcox's transition from private practice to 
general counsel of a Utah county company and the transfer of the case to new counsel at 
Clyde Snow & Sessions were unforeseen. But when the Welshes pointed out the lack of 
evidentiary basis for the sanctions in their Motion for Relief from the January 22 Order, 
the trial court did not grant the Welshes a hearing or initiate other fact finding procedures. 
Instead, the trial court made post hoc findings to justify the sanctions in its April 14 
Order denying the Welshes Motion for Relief from the January 22 Order. {See April 14 
Order, Addendum B to the Welshes' opening Brief). This deprived the Welshes of any 
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opportunity to meaningfully address the alleged conduct for which they were sanctioned, 
which is error and, as discussed below, a violation of due process. 
C. The Welshes Themselves are Completely Blameless for Any Delays, 
Making the Imposition of Sanctions Against them Personally an 
Independent Abuse of Discretion. 
The trial court further abused its discretion by imposing sanctions against the 
Welshes' personally, without any evidence to support even an inference of intentional 
misconduct by the Welshes. "[W]here discovery sanctions are concerned, i f the fault 
lies with the attorneys, that is where the impact of the sanction should be lodged.'" 
Kilpatrick, 2008 UT 82 at [^39 (citation omitted). There are no facts in the record to 
suggest that the Welshes were personally aware of the dates in the September 30, 2008 
Scheduling Order. More important, there is no evidence that the Welshes personally 
sought to amend any of the scheduling orders or caused any of delays. This lack of 
evidence is fatal to the trial court's imposition of sanctions against the Welshes. 
Notwithstanding the complete lack of sanctionable conduct by the Welshes, 
Lakeview curiously argues the sanctions were appropriate because the "barring of expert 
witnesses is not a sanction aimed directly at the Welshes, as opposed to a monetary fine, 
a finding of contempt of court, or a complete dismissal of the complaint." (Lakeview's 
Brief, p. 29.) This could not be further from the truth. The claims in this case belong to 
the Welshes, not their attorneys. A sanction excluding evidence is directed at the party 
because it may affect the party's ability to recover on his or her claim. By contrast, a 
sanction against the attorney would be a monetary fine against the attorney personally. 
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Lakeview also asserts that the "supreme court in Kilpatrick recognized that 
sanctions lodged against an attorney will typically impact a client." (Lakeview's Brief, p. 
29.) This argument belies the point: sanctions were not lodged against the Welshes' 
counsel, but against the Welshes themselves. 
Moreover, Lakeview mischaracterizes the Supreme Court's statement in 
Kilpatrick Contrary to Lakeview's representation, there were no sanctions lodged 
against the attorney in Kilpatrick; the trial court dismissed the case because the plaintiff 
violated the scheduling order by failing to obtain an autopsy in an asbestos-related tort 
case. See Kilpatrick, 2008 UT 82 at l|j24. The Supreme Court reversed because there was 
no indication that the plaintiff "willfully" disregarded the scheduling order even though 
she failed to preserve evidence. See id. at ^24-39. The Supreme Court based its 
decision, in part, on the fact that it was unclear who was at fault for the noncompliance— 
the client or the attorneys—because "our case law resists sanctioning a party whose 
noncompliance is due to someone else's failure." See id. at ffi[36, 39 (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court noted, however, that "even in the absence of a direct sanction against 
a client, the truth of the matter is that an attorney's failure will typically impact the 
client." Id. atf39. 
Thus, contrary to Lakeview's insinuation, the Kilpatrick court did not hold that the 
conduct of the attorney may be imputed to justify sanctions against the client, or vice-
versa. Rather, the Supreme Court merely observed the general proposition that an 
inadvertent failing by an attorney, or poor lawyering, may negatively impact a client, 
even if this would not justify a sanction. Kilpatrick reaffirms the general rule that 
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sanctions may only be imposed where there is willful misconduct by the person being 
sanctioned. See id. at |^36 ("We believe that [a sanction] is unjust when it is imposed 
against a person who had absolutely no fault for the discovery violation at issue...." 
(alteration in original) (quoting Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App 152,^36-37, 71 P.3d 
601)). 
In the present case, the record is devoid of any evidence of willful noncompliance 
by the Welshes. Indeed, Mr. Welsh suffered severe brain damage as a result of 
Lakeview's negligence and cannot be faulted for any delays. While the trial court would 
have been justified in sanctioning neither the Welshes nor their counsel, the trial court 
clearly abused its discretion in sanctioning the Welshes. 
II. LAKEVIEW'S CASES ARE DISTINGUISHABLE. 
Lakeview cites to several cases on pages 21-22 and 24 of its Brief that Lakeview 
claims support the trial court's decision to impose sanctions for discovery violations. The 
Welshes do not dispute that the trial court has general authority, upon a proper 
evidentiary basis, to impose sanctions for discovery violations. However, all of the cases 
cited by Lakeview are distinguishable from this case based on the following key facts: 
• There is no evidence of willful noncompliance by the Welshes nor their 
counsel. Rather than simply disregard the deadline for submitting expert 
disclosures and reports, the Welshes filed a Motion for an Enlargement of 
time, prior to expiration of the deadline, requesting a modest 39-day 
extension. (R.72-74; See also Section I, above.) 
• The Welshes' Motion for Enlargement of Time caused no prejudice to 
Lakeview or the trial court, as it would not have changed any other dates in 
the September 30, 2008 Scheduling Order, including the deadlines for 
completion of expert discovery, dispositive motions, and the yet-to-be-
scheduled trial date. Tellingly, Lakeview has never argued it would have 
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been prejudiced by the extension. (R. 72-74; see also September 30, 2008 
Scheduling Order.) 
• Prior to sanctioning the Welshes on January 22, 2009, the trial court 
granted the Welshes' Motion for Enlargement of Time on December 29, 
2008. The Welshes incurred significant cost in preparing their expert 
reports and submitted them by the extended deadline imposed by the trial 
court in its December 29, 2008 Ruling. (R.140-42; 202-03; 241-46; 273, 
279, 272-96.) 
• Lakeview's counsel was a significant contributor to the delays in this case. 
(See Section 1(A), above.) 
• The Welshes obtained new counsel, Rodney Snow and Matthew Steward, 
in November 2008, just prior to the expert discovery deadline. (R. 71-72; 
76.) 
Accordingly, regardless of the trial court's general authority to impose sanctions 
for discovery violations established by these cases, the facts and circumstances of the 
present case do not warrant sanctions. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED ITS DECEMBER 29, 
2008 RULING GRANTING THE WELSHES' MOTION FOR 
ENLARGEMENT OF TIME BECAUSE THE WELSHES RELIED ON 
THIS ORDER. 
Lakeview acknowledges that the trial court's December 29, 2008 Ruling was a 
minute entry by the trial court granting the Welshes' Motion. Indeed, this is indisputable. 
However, Lakeview argues that the trial court had the authority to change its mind under 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because the trial court's December 29, 
2008 Ruling was not a binding order of the trial court. Lakeview is wrong. 
Rule 54(b) permits a trial court, in certain circumstances, to change its nonfinal 
decisions. Here, however, the trial court did not rely on Rule 54(b) as the grounds for 
changing its decision. Rather, the trial court purported to rely on Rule 60(a), which is 
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clearly not applicable for the reasons set forth in the Welshes' opening Brief, pp. 23-25. 
More important, Lakeview ignores that the December 29, 2008 Ruling was relied upon 
by the Welshes before it was reversed. Specifically, based upon the trial court's ruling, 
the Welshes incurred significant costs in submitting their expert reports by the revised 
deadline. All of this was done before the trial court reversed itself on January 22, 2009. 
The present situation is not a good fit for Rule 54(b), which is generally reserved 
for reconsideration of an issue previously ruled upon after new facts suggest that the 
initial ruling was incorrect. Rule 54(b) should not be used to justify a simple changing-
of-the-mind, particularly when nothing actually changes between the time a motion is 
first considered, and when it is reconsidered. Utah's jurisprudence promotes a "judicial 
policy favoring finality." See Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2,T|36, 201 
P.3d 966. The doctrine of "law of the case," for example, provides that "a decision made 
on an issue during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of the same 
litigation." IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & KMgmt, Inc., 2008 UT 73, ^  26, 196 P.3d 
588 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord See State v. Ruiz, 2009 UT 
App 121, «[j 10, 210 P.3d 955 ("The rationale underlying the [law of the case] doctrine 'is 
that in the interest of economy of time and efficiency of procedure, it is desirable to avoid 
the delays and the difficulties involved in repetitious contentions and rulings upon the 
same proposition in the same case.'" (citation omitted)). 
This is particularly true in the present case, because of the type of ruling at issue. 
This was not a reconsideration of a ruling on a summary judgment motion, where a more 
developed record demonstrated that the initial ruling was contrary to law. Rather, the 
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December 28 Ruling granted a Motion to Enlarge Time for submitting expert reports, 
which were submitted in accordance with the revised deadline provided by that ruling. 
To change that ruling after the fact does not make sense and has no apparent purpose but 
to arbitrarily punish one of the parties—in this case the Welshes. In fact, for this Court to 
allow such an apparently groundless reversal sets a dangerous precedent. If the trial court 
can change its mind so capriciously in this instance, what is to prevent the trial court from 
now deciding it no longer wants to grant any of the amended scheduling orders, 
retroactively reinstating the first scheduling order, and dismissing the case for failure to 
meet the deadlines of the first scheduling order? Although such an occurrence seems 
implausible, it is not far afield from what the trial court did in reversing the December 29, 
2008 Ruling. Accordingly, principles of justice, fairness and finality dictate that this 
Court should vacate the trial court's January 22 and April 14 Orders and reinstate the 
December 29, 2008 Ruling. 
IV. THE SANCTIONS VIOLATED THE WELSHES' DUE PROCESS 
RIGHTS. 
Due process requires, at a minimum, "notice and a right to respond before the 
sanctions of costs, expenses, or attorney's fees are imposed." F.D.I.C. v. Daily, 973 F.2d 
1525, 1531 (10th Cir. 1992); Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 280 (Utah 
1997) (Stewart, J. dissenting) (observing that "constitutional due process rights may be 
violated if a court refuses to hear the merits of the case where there has been a relatively 
trivial infraction of procedural rules" (emphasis added)). Lakeview asserts that neither 
a hearing nor fact finding proceedings were necessary to preserve the Welshes' due 
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process rights because the facts justifying the sanctions are apparent on the record. 
Lakeview also argues that the sanctions did not deprive the Welshes' of due process 
because they were given an opportunity to address the sanctions through their Motion for 
Relief from the January 22 Order. Both arguments are meritless. 
As detailed above, Lakeview's first argument fails because there is no evidentiary 
basis apparent on the record to justify sanctions against even the Welshes' counsel, let 
alone the Welshes. (See Section I, above.) In addition, contrary to Lakeview's argument, 
it was not blameless for the delays in this case. (See id.) 
Moreover, Lakeview misses the point. The trial court imposed sua sponte 
sanctions for failing to comply with the scheduling order on January 22, 2008, after the 
trial court had already granted the Welshes and their counsel an extension of time to 
submit expert reports on December 29, 2008. The Welshes were therefore not given 
notice or an opportunity to respond before these sanctions were imposed. The Tenth 
Circuit describes the problem with sua sponte sanctions in Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 
1504 (10th Cir. 1987): 
[T]he determination to impose sanctions . . . involves another 
step—placing the blame. And there remains for 
consideration the defenses which might absolve the 
[sanctioned party] of the responsibility for taking the [action 
for which he was sanctioned]. This, we hold, justifies and 
requires notice and opportunity to be heard before final 
judgment. 
Id. (emphasis added). Here, the trial court made no inquiry and ordered no hearing or 
fact-finding procedure to determine whether the Welshes were personally to blame or 
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whether they had any defenses that might absolve them of responsibility for the discovery 
violation. 
That the Welshes were able to file a Motion for Relief from the January 22 Order 
does not cure the due process violation. Prior to imposing sanctions, the trial court failed 
to determine that the Welshes willfully failed to comply with the September 30, 2008 
Scheduling Order. Once apprised of this omission by the Welshes, rather than grant them 
a hearing to discuss the sanctions or issue an order to show cause, in its April 14 Order 
the trial court made a finding of implied willfulness to try to support the sanctions after 
the fact. As such, the Welshes were never given an opportunity to address the alleged 
conduct for which they were sanctioned. Moreover, because no fact finding was done 
with respect to the sanctions, the record in this case did not change between January 22, 
2009 and April 14, 2009. Thus, no new facts were developed to justify the sanctions. No 
evidence has ever existed that would support a finding of willfulness, bad faith or other 
intentional misconduct by the Welshes. 
Finally, the trial court's admonishment to move the case along did not satisfy the 
Welshes' due process rights. At best, this would satisfy the notice aspect of due process, 
but not the required opportunity to be heard. However, that the admonishment was 
adequate notice is itself dubious. Based on the admonishment, the Welshes' counsel 
knew that the case needed to be moved along or it would be dismissed.4 The Welshes' 
Motion for an Enlargement of Time did not trigger this condition as it only sought a 
4
 As indicated, there is no evidence indicating that the Welshes themselves knew the 
contents of the September 30, 2008 Scheduling Order. 
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minor extension to designate experts and submit expert reports, not to change any other 
dates. Accordingly, the Motion would not have delayed ultimate resolution of the case, 
had the trial court not reversed its December 29, 2008 Ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and those reasons set forth in the Welshes' opening 
Brief, the trial court's January 22, 2009 Order and April 14, 2009 Order must be reversed 
as erroneous, an abuse of discretion, and a violation of due process, and then remanded 
for further proceedings. ^ 1 
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